November 5, 2017

Superficial and Systemic Corruption Among Regulators


You’re Pre-Approved, if you’re a big corporation.

Ex-GM developer turned critic Belinda Martineau is intrigued that the New York Times, in discussing Henry Miller’s role in Monsanto’s regulatory ghost-writing, doesn’t mention that Miller was an FDA cadre in charge of biotech regulation from 1989-1994. She’s right, the mainstream media systematically avoids placing any “abuse” it’s forced to acknowledge into any broader context.
But by the same token I’m similarly intrigued that Martineau, along with most other GMO critics, still thinks that the main problem with regulatory agencies is particular “corrupt” cadres like Miller or the EPA’s Jess Rowland (or, to add everyone’s favorite, Michael Taylor), rather than the congenital institutional structure of an agency like the FDA or EPA. But these agencies were designed to “manage” poisons (and the politics of poison), not to protect the people and environment against poisons. The only thing distinguishing the likes of Miller or Taylor from a regular career cadre is that these are examples of de jure “corruption” who transcend the standard institutional banality-of-evil structure. But this de jure corruption is only a minor if more politically visible appendage to the systemic corruption.
Therefore, while reformists by their nature will be content to emphasize only the superficial appendage, since they want only superficial reforms (i.e. they agree that poisonism should continue, it merely needs more and better “management”), abolitionists must highlight the inflammatory yet superficial corruption only as an introduction to the facts about systemic corruption.
Propagate the necessary new ideas.

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